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FALLING THROUGH THE GAP:
THE CULPABILITY OF CHILD SOLDIERS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Ally McQueen*
INTRODUCTION
When asked to picture the “poster child” victim of contemporary armed
conflict, many think of just that: a child. In the last decade alone, armed conflicts
have “killed two million children, disabled four to five million children and left
twelve million children homeless.” 1 Given those statistics, it is difficult to imagine
that children could play any role in an armed conflict apart from that of the victim.
In reality, however, child soldiers2 are responsible for some of the most horrific
atrocities in modern warfare, including grave violations of international criminal
law.
“[C]hild soldiering today is a widespread phenomenon, . . . particularly in
developing countries where political, economic, and social instability are more
commonplace.”3 An estimated 300,000 child soldiers, some as young as seven years
old, are currently serving both state and nonstate forces in more than thirty
international and internal conflicts around the world. 4 Though child soldiers have
been used in armed conflicts throughout history, current statistics portray a sobering

* Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2018. I would like to thank Professor Jimmy
Gurulé for his helpful guidance and the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review Online for their edits
and recommendations. I would also like to give a special thanks to Cassie Redlingshafer—who sat
next to me on many Swiss train rides spent drafting this Essay—for her friendship and support
throughout law school. All errors are my own.
1 Amy Beth Abbott, Note, Child Soldiers—The Use of Children as Instruments of War, 23
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 499, 499–500 (2000).
2 As it is used throughout this Essay, the term “child soldier” is used to describe children—
male or female—under the age of eighteen who serve an armed organization in any capacity. This
broad understanding of child soldiers is consistent with UNICEF’s widely accepted Cape Town
Principles. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
3 Susan Tiefenbrun, Child Soldiers, Slavery and the Trafficking of Children, 31 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 415, 421 (2008).
4 See Crystal E. Lara, Note, Child Soldier Testimony Used in Prosecuting War Crimes in
the International Criminal Court: Preventing Further Victimization, 17 SW. J. INT’L L. 309, 313
(2011); Fact Sheet: Children Associated with Armed Groups and Forces Central Africa, UNICEF,
https://www.unicef.org/wcaro/FactSheet100601Final_E_100603_.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2018);
Douglas Farah, Children Forced to Kill, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2000),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/04/08/children-forced-to-kill/f94039010b0f-480f-bad7-16bc78835c81/?utm_term=.00d98dd5fc10.
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and distinctive trend: a steady increase in the use of individuals under the age of
eighteen in warfare.
In response to this disturbing development, the international community has
explicitly condemned the use and recruitment of child soldiers. While that much is
clear, international conventions, U.N. resolutions, and international courts and
tribunals have failed to explicitly answer two fundamental questions: Should child
soldiers be prosecuted for their crimes? If so, at what age should children be held
legally responsible for their actions, and what legal standard should apply? This
Essay will explore this gap in international criminal law and the unique difficulty of
determining the accountability of children who are both victims and perpetrators.
This Essay, in Part I, will begin with an overview of the use of child soldiers
in armed conflicts around the world. Part II will explore provisions within the
Geneva Conventions, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Beijing
Rules that are applicable to child soldiers and can shed some light on their culpability
after an armed conflict. In Part III, this Essay will then discuss the varying degrees
to which international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court have
addressed the criminal responsibility of children for war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Finally, Part IV will analyze this fragmented body of international
criminal law and identify two overarching elements it shares: the best interest of the
child standard and the emphasis on rehabilitation and reintegration. This Essay will
argue that, in light of this consistent message and the realities of child soldiering,
international criminal law must fix the minimum age of criminal liability at eighteen.
This Essay will go on to argue that, should a State insist on prosecuting children
during negotiations with the United Nations to create a hybrid domesticinternational tribunal, a distinct legal standard with explicit protections for young
perpetrators must be put in place.
I.

THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS ACROSS THE WORLD
A. Who Are Child Soldiers?

Hundreds of thousands of children under the age of eighteen are currently
serving in armed forces5 in more than thirty countries around the world. 6 While
many of these children are engaged directly in warfare, the term “child soldier”
encompasses far more young people than those who carry weapons, engage in
combat, or take a direct part in hostilities. As defined in UNICEF’s widely accepted
Cape Town Principles, a child soldier is:
[A]ny person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks,
porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family
members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for

5 Child soldiers are used by a variety of armed groups, “including government-backed
paramilitary groups, militias and self-defense units, armed groups opposed to central government,
groups composed of ethnic religious and other minorities, and clan-based or factional groups
fighting governments.” Lara, supra note 4, at 313.
6 Abbott, supra note 1, at 512.
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forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or
7
has carried arms.

Although the specific number of children who are currently serving in armed
forces is impossible to verify, most organizations agree that there are approximately
300,000 child soldiers across the globe.8 The most widespread use of child soldiers
occurs in developing countries, particularly those suffering from continuous political
and economic instability, and those where a significant portion of the population is
made up of children.9 While the use of child soldiers is most prevalent in Africa,
where more than 120,000 children are engaged in active combat, 10 juvenile
involvement in armed conflict is not limited to that continent. 11 Beyond African
countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Somalia, child
soldiers are currently involved in armed conflicts in Burma, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and
Yemen, among others.12
While “[n]o single common social denominator or personal motive links all
the children who [have been] in combat,”13 child soldiers generally come from
similar backgrounds.14 The first children to be recruited into armed groups are
generally “the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children—those without
traditional families to protect them, those with little or no education, and those from
marginalized sectors of society.”15 The vast majority of child soldiers come from
poor, conflict-ridden areas and grow up knowing nothing but war. 16 Children who

7 UNICEF, CAPE TOWN PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES 12 (1997),
https://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf; see also UNICEF, THE PARIS
PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON CHILDREN ASSOCIATED WITH ARMED FORCES OR
ARMED GROUPS 7 (2007), https://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf
(broadly defining a child soldier as “[a] child associated with an armed force or armed group”).
8 Tessa Davis, Note, Lost in Doctrine: Particular Social Group, Child Soldiers, and the
Failure of U.S. Asylum Law to Protect Exploited Children, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 654 (2011).
9 Mary-Hunter Morris, Note, Babies and Bathwater: Seeking an Appropriate Standard of
Review for the Asylum Applications of Former Child Soldiers, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 281, 283
(2008).
10 Nienke Grossman, Rehabilitation or Revenge: Prosecuting Child Soldiers for Human
Rights Violations, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 323, 326 (2007). One of the reasons this practice is so
prominent across Africa is because children make up the majority of the continent’s population.
DAVID M. ROSEN, ARMIES OF THE YOUNG: CHILD SOLDIERS IN WAR AND TERRORISM 62 (2005).
Fifty-five percent of the total African population is nineteen years or younger (compared to the
United States, where this age group only constitutes twenty-eight percent of the population). Id.
11 For a comprehensive list of the countries where children have served as child soldiers, see
Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 422–32. For a breakdown of how many children are currently serving
in various countries, see Farah, supra note 4.
12 Jo Becker, A Better US List of Countries Using Child Soldiers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June
29, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/29/better-us-list-countries-using-child-soldiers.
13 ROSEN, supra note 10, at 61.
14 Child soldiers generally fit this profile regardless of whether they are forcibly recruited or
they voluntarily join an armed group. Lara, supra note 4, at 314.
15 Stephanie H. Bald, Comment, Searching for a Lost Childhood: Will the Special Court of
Sierra Leone Find Justice for Its Children?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 537, 545 (2002).
16 Id.; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children:
Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, ¶¶ 37–38, U.N. Doc. A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996) [hereinafter
Machel Report] (explaining that children from poorer sectors are at a particularly high risk for
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have been separated from their families or displaced from their homes are
particularly vulnerable.17 Although “the average age of child soldiers continues to
decrease, a paradigmatic child soldier is in his or her late preteen to midteenage years
with the average being between twelve and thirteen years old.”18
B. Why Are Children Targeted to Fight?
The decision to target children stems not only from an armed group’s need to
bolster their forces, but from characteristics inextricably linked to childhood.
Children are generally more physically and psychologically vulnerable than adults,
making them easier for armed forces to control, intimidate, and manipulate. 19
Children are also less demanding than adults, making them an economically efficient
source of labor.20 Unlike mature soldiers, children are generally willing to serve at
the “bottom of [the] military hierarchy” and rarely demand pay.21
Groups also target young adolescents and children for their small size and
sense of fearlessness. In many cases, a child’s size allows him or her to evade
capture.22 Children’s small size also enables military leaders to use them as “guinea
pigs” for some of their most dangerous assignments. 23 Children are often forced “to
the front lines or [through] minefields ahead of older troops while their commanders
stay behind.”24 While such assignments would sound like a death sentence to older
soldiers, commanders can easily exploit fearless children who “view themselves as
invulnerable to harm and injury.” 25 Finally, many armed groups target children
because they consider them to be an expendable labor source, particularly as
compared to trained adults.26 In developing countries where children make up as
much as half of the population, young people are “in such bountiful supply” 27 that
“another child will always be available to abduct and exploit.” 28
Though military groups have utilized child soldiers throughout history, 29 the
deliberate recruitment of child soldiers has dramatically increased in recent years.
recruitment, while children from wealthier and more educated families are at less risk); Tiefenbrun,
supra note 3, at 431.
17 Davis, supra note 8, at 656.
18 Id. (footnotes omitted).
19 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 432.
20 Davis, supra note 8, at 657.
21 Id.
22 Id. Not only is it easier for children to hide than adults, but opposing parties generally do
not suspect children of being soldiers. Id.
23 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 431.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 432–33 (quoting BENJAMIN JAMES SADOCK & VIRGINIA ALCOTT SADOCK, KAPLAN
& SADOCK’S SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY 38 (9th ed. 2003)).
26 Davis, supra note 8, at 657.
27 Id. (quoting MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS: FROM VIOLENCE TO PROTECTION 37
(2006)).
28 Id.
29 “Children’s participation in armed conflict has occurred for centuries” and they have
“fought in wars dating back to the Middle Ages.” Cristina Martinez Squires, Comment, How the
Law Should View Voluntary Child Soldiers: Does Terrorism Pose a Different Dilemma?, 68 SMU
L. REV. 567, 567 (2015). Until the mid-twentieth century, the armies of Western Europe and the
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Two interrelated factors can explain this rise in the abduction and use of child
soldiers.
First, fundamental changes in the nature of armed conflicts have increased the
use of children as instruments of war. Unlike past conflicts, which were generally
“temporary outbreaks of instability” between different states, today’s conflicts are
characterized by “long, protracted states of mass violence and disorder.”30 Since the
end of the Cold War, the world’s conflicts have also become more internalized, often
occurring between armed civilians or ethnic factions. 31 During these internalized
conflicts, opposing sides generally do not distinguish between children and adults
and the line between civilian and combatant is often blurred.32 In addition, “[w]ars
are no longer confined to definitive battlefields” and children often find themselves
in war zones.33 With fighting regularly occurring in populated areas, “recruiters can
easily take children from villages, roadsides, buses, schools, markets, and
churches.”34 Further, modern armed warfare generally lasts much longer than past
conflicts.35 As casualties rise, some armed forces believe that recruiting children is
an easy and necessary means of filling shortages in manpower.36 The length of
modern wars has also “encouraged military leaders to rationalize the forced
recruitment and use of children as a low cost military measure.” 37
Second, many argue that technological developments and the emergence of the
small-arms trade have transformed the roles children are capable of playing in war.
With the emergence of lightweight, easy-to-carry weapons, children are no longer
limited to serving in indirect support roles such as lookouts, spies, or messengers. 38
Modern-day weapons such as assault rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, and
pistols are easy to operate and can be used as effectively by children as adults. 39
These technological advances have made it much easier for young people to become

United States were filled with “boy soldiers.” See generally ROSEN, supra note 10, at 4–8
(describing the prominence of American and British soldiers under the age of eighteen in the
Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and World War I). See also id. at 19–56 (detailing the use of
Jewish child soldiers during World War II).
30 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 430. In her famous U.N. Report The Impact of War on
Children, Graça Machel attributed the “callousness of modern warfare” to the breakdown of
traditional societies brought about by globalization and social revolution. Machel Report, supra
note 16, ¶ 4; see also id. ¶¶ 4, 24 (distinguishing traditional, rule-bound warfare from conflicts in
postcolonial states where “all standards [are] abandoned” and a special “sense of dislocation and
chaos” reigns).
31 Bald, supra note 15, at 544.
32 Lara, supra note 4, at 313–14.
33 Bald, supra note 15, at 542.
34 Id.
35 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 428.
36 Id. at 430.
37 Id. at 428. In Angola, for instance, the civil war spanned over thirty years, making
volunteers difficult to find. “To alleviate the manpower shortage, [Angola’s] rebel and government
forces look[ed] to the nation’s youth to fill their army’s ranks.” Abbott, supra note 1, at 511.
38 ROSEN, supra note 10, at 14.
39 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 431. But see ROSEN, supra note 10, at 14.
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direct combatants in an armed conflict. As a result of the international arms trade,
most of these weapons are relatively affordable and easy to obtain. 40
C. How Are Child Soldiers Recruited?
Children’s recruitment in armed conflict is either by force or voluntary. A
significant portion of the children who participate in armed conflicts are abducted or
forcibly recruited after receiving threats. 41 Countless children have been taken from
their own homes,42 while others have been arbitrarily removed from public spaces
such as buses, marketplaces, churches, and refugee camps. 43 Children who
volunteer for service in armed groups may be driven to do so by a range of “cultural,
social, economic or political pressures.” 44 Most children who volunteer for
participation in conflicts do so in order to fulfill their basic needs.45 In war-torn and
impoverished areas, children may think that alternative means of securing consistent
food and shelter are simply unavailable. 46 For others, service with an armed group
is seen as a means of ensuring their own safety.47 Many children join “merely in an
attempt to survive,” understandably feeling safer as armed soldiers than as
defenseless civilians.48 Those who have grown up in a war-torn environment may
feel obligated to join the military regime out of a sense of loyalty or in order to
avenge the death or deaths of close family members and friends.49 For some
children, the decision stems from a desire to be part of a cohesive group.50
“[Children] want to belong to something, especially if they live in a society that has
collapsed completely,” and armed groups can provide them with the structured
community they seek.51 Others are simply bored, attracted to the culture of violence
they have been raised in, and lacking the education necessary to understand what
they are signing up for.52

40 Monique Ramgoolie, Prosecution of Sierra Leone’s Child Soldiers: What Message Is the
UN Trying to Send?, 12 J. PUB. & INT’L AFF. 145, 148 (2001). In some parts of Africa, AK-47s
are available for less than six dollars. Id.
41 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 423.
42 Id.
43 Abbott, supra note 1, at 514.
44 Machel Report, supra note 16, ¶ 38.
45 Abbott, supra note 1, at 516.
46 Many poor and hungry families are coerced to sell their children to armed forces in order
to secure food or money. Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 432. “Many of these parents do not
understand the danger they are subjecting their child[ren] to by making them join the army.” Id.;
see also Machel Report, supra note 16, ¶ 39.
47 Machel Report, supra note 16, ¶ 41 (“Faced with violence and chaos all around, they
decide they are safer with guns in their hands.”).
48 Abbott, supra note 1, at 516.
49 Id.; see also Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 431–32.
50 Errol Barnett, Ex-Child-Soldier: “Shooting Became Just Like Drinking a Glass of Water,”
CNN (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/08/world/africa/ishmael-beah-childsoldier/index.html.
51 Id.
52 ROSEN, supra note 10, at 61; Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 427.
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D. What Roles Do Child Soldiers Play in Armed Conflict?
After child soldiers are conscripted, they “enter a new world”53 filled with
violence and “the worst forms of child abuse.”54 From the beginning of their
association with the armed group, young people are deliberately exposed to horrific
scenes and “forced to participate in acts of extreme violence and barbarity including
beheadings, amputations, rape, and the burning of people alive.” 55 Desensitizing
children to the sight and commission of atrocities “brainwashe[s them] . . . until their
ethics and moral values become so distorted” that they robotically obey orders. 56
For many child soldiers, participation in armed conflict begins with brutal
hazing practices aimed at desensitizing them to violence and turning them into
hardened, dangerous killing machines. These indoctrination procedures can
“include everything from torture and beatings inflicted upon the new recruit to
forcing him or her to commit these atrocities on others.” 57 In order to keep the child
firmly within the army’s control, many are forced to commit acts of violence against
their families, friends, or members of their communities as part of their
indoctrination.58 Forcing children to kill or disfigure someone they know effectively
dissolves their ties with the world outside of the armed group and ensures that they
will be permanently alienated from their family and community. 59 Over the course
of their association with the armed group, “[c]hildren endure torture, physical abuse,
and threats of death” to maintain their obedience.60 Military officials do not hesitate
to execute attempted escapees,61 and children are threatened with death or
dismemberment if they refuse to fight. 62
Fighting groups generally do not afford child soldiers any special treatment
because of their young age.63 To the contrary, child soldiers generally “suffer[]
additional exploitive abuse because of their age.” 64 Because they are viewed as
expendable, children are often given the most dangerous tasks and pushed to the
front lines. Armed groups often capitalize on a child’s size and inexperience by
using them to clear unexplored areas or sending them “to serve as advance forces in
ambush attacks and in suicide bombings.”65 Since “[t]he youngest children rarely
appreciate the perils they face,” many armed groups use hallucinatory drugs or
alcohol to further manipulate their child soldiers and capitalize on their

53 Davis, supra note 8, at 658.
54 ROSEN, supra note 10, at 16.
55 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 425.
56 Id. at 423.
57 Grossman, supra note 10, at 328.
58 Id.
59 ROSEN, supra note 10, at 16.
60 Davis, supra note 8, at 658.
61 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 423. Children are often “required to kill friends who don’t
obey the commanders, and made to watch the punishment of other child soldiers who attempt in
vain to escape.” Id.
62 Id.
63 See Bald, supra note 15, at 552.
64 Id.
65 Abbott, supra note 1, at 507–08.
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fearlessness.66 Those who are not engaged directly in combat serve in “support
functions which entail great risk and hardship.” 67
Although the majority of child soldiers are boys, armed groups also recruit
girls, many of whom perform combat functions. 68 In addition to the roles they share
with their male counterparts, female child soldiers also face gender-specific abuses.
Many are “given to military commanders as ‘wives,’ and victimized by sexual
violence on a daily basis.”69
II.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW’S GUIDANCE ON THE CULPABILITY OF
CHILDREN INVOLVED IN ARMED CONFLICT

While there is not one particular instrument that clearly lays out whether
children involved in armed conflicts should be held accountable for their crimes,
various binding and nonbinding sources of international law can shed some light on
this question. This Part will explore three sources of international law that are
particularly relevant to the culpability of child soldiers: the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and its Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,
and the Beijing Rules.70 While these treaty-based laws seems to permit the arrest,
trial, and imprisonment of child soldiers, none of these instruments establish a
minimum age of criminal liability.
A. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are at the core of international
humanitarian law. Each of the Conventions seeks to protect people who are not
taking part in international hostilities, and the fourth Convention provides specific
standards for the treatment of civilians, including children, in times of war. 71
Though the Conventions contemplate the possibility that minors can commit war
crimes and can lawfully be prosecuted for their acts, they fail to set a minimum age

66 Machel Report, supra note 16, ¶ 47.
67 Id. ¶ 44 (listing child solders’ various support functions, including serving as porters and
performing household duties).
68 Jan Goodwin, Sierra Leone Is No Place to Be Young, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/14/magazine/sierra-leone-is-no-place-to-be-young.html.
Young girls “make up forty percent of the ranks of armed groups in some countries.” Tiefenbrun,
supra note 3, at 424.
69 Id. at 424; see also, e.g., Machel Report, supra note 16, ¶ 45 (describing the practice of
marrying off girls abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda to rebel leaders); Goodwin,
supra note 68 (recounting the experience of “I,” a young Sierra Leonean girl who was abducted
from her village and forced to become a sex slave for rebel forces).
70 Other nonbinding sources of international law that are relevant to the culpability of child
soldiers but are beyond the scope of this Essay include the Cape Town Principles and Best
Practices, the Paris Principles, and the Paris Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful
Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed Groups.
71 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art.
50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]
(concerning the care and education of children during times of war).
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of criminal responsibility. Apart from excluding children from capital punishment, 72
no distinction is made in the Geneva Conventions between prosecuting adults and
juveniles.
Additional Protocols I and II of 1977 add much-needed clarity to the standards
of treatment of children during an armed conflict, but still leave many questions
regarding their culpability open to debate. Additional Protocol I, which focuses on
the protection of civilians in international armed conflicts, emphasizes that
“[c]hildren shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected against any
form of indecent assault.”73 The Protocol added a provision obligating States to
prevent children under the age of fifteen from taking part in international armed
conflict74 and reiterated Convention IV’s prohibition on the death penalty for
youthful offenders.75 Though Brazil’s representative suggested during the drafting
period that Additional Protocol I should include a minimum age of criminal
responsibility, the Committee ultimately decided to leave the issue to national
regulation.76
Additional Protocol II, which focuses on the protection of civilians in internal
armed conflicts, echoes many of these provisions. Article 4 provides that “[c]hildren
who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed
forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities,” 77 and Article 6 “applies to
the prosecution and punishment of criminal offences related to the armed conflict.” 78
Again, no explicit guidance is given in Additional Protocol II as to whether child
soldiers can or should be prosecuted for their crimes. Article 6 limits itself to
banning the death penalty for crimes committed by children, 79 enumerating a series
of due process rights to which offenders are entitled,80 and broadly stating that “[a]t

72 See id. art. 68 (“In any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected
person who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offence.”).
73 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims in International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 77, ¶ 1, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
74 Id. art. 77, ¶ 2 (“The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that
children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in
particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting among
those . . . who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour
to give priority to those who are oldest.”).
75 Id. art. 77, ¶ 5 (“The death penalty for an offence related to the armed conflict shall not be
executed on persons who had not attained the age of eighteen years at the time the offence was
committed.”).
76 During the negotiations of Additional Protocol I, the representative of Brazil proposed that
Article 77 include a prohibition on the prosecution of children under the age of sixteen. See
Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers: Victims or Perpetrators?, 29 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 56, 74
(2008).
77 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4, ¶ 3(c), June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
78 Id. art. 6, ¶ 1.
79 Id. art. 6, ¶ 4.
80 Id. art. 6, ¶¶ 2, 3.
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the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest
possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict.” 81
B. The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) is the most
widely ratified human rights instrument in history. 82 It was the first U.N. convention
devoted solely to children’s rights, and it remains the most comprehensive treaty
concerned with issues related to children’s well-being today.83 Despite its wideranging protections for children,84 the CRC dances around the accountability of
children who commit crimes. The CRC’s sometimes-contradictory provisions seem
to allow for the criminal prosecution and imprisonment of juvenile offenders, but
the Convention fails to set a minimum age of criminal responsibility. Though the
Convention clearly defines a child as “every human being below the age of eighteen
years,”85 it opts to allow its State Parties to determine whether children should be
prosecuted for crimes committed during armed conflicts. 86
The overriding substantive mandate of the CRC can be found in Article 3,
which requires that “[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.”87 Under this “umbrella provision,” “when two or more rights are in
apparent conflict, the best interests of the child is the guiding consideration.”88
Articles 37 and 40 provide extensive due process rights for children and give
some important insights into whether they should be prosecuted for crimes
committed as minors. First and foremost, the CRC states that children cannot be
“deprived of [their] liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily” and, should “arrest, detention
or imprisonment” be considered appropriate in a particular case, it “shall be used
only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”89
Like the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, the CRC bans capital

81 Id. art. 6, ¶ 5.
82 The CRC has been ratified by every country in the world except the United States and
Somalia. Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 439.
83 Abbott, supra note 1, at 502–03.
84 The CRC broadly covers “three baskets” of rights to which all children are entitled. Linda
A. Malone, Maturing Justice: Integrating the Convention on the Rights of the Child into the
Judgments and Processes of the International Criminal Court, 43 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 599,
602 (2015). “First, they have to be provided with adequate nutrients, shelter, family environment,
education, healthcare and recreation. Second, they should be protected from abuse and
exploitation. Third, they should participate in decision making for themselves and in social,
economic, religious, and political life.” Id.
85 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448 [hereinafter
Convention on the Rights of the Child].
86 See infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
87 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 3, ¶ 1.
88 Malone, supra note 84, at 617.
89 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 37(b).
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punishment.90 Article 37(a) adds that children also should not be sentenced to “life
imprisonment without possibility of release . . . for offences committed [when they
were] below eighteen years of age.”91 Article 40 goes on to say that, when dealing
with children who have “infringed the penal law,” “States Parties . . . [shall] take[]
into account the child’s age and the desirability of promoting the child’s
reintegration and the child’s assuming a constructive role in society.” 92 Though
Article 40 lays out a list of due process guarantees “[e]very child alleged as or
accused of having infringed the penal law” is entitled to,93 the CRC leaves it to State
Parties to set a baseline age of criminal responsibility. 94 As a result of this provision,
the minimum age of criminal responsibility is left up to national legislatures and
varies widely from country to country. 95 Article 40 also leaves it to State Parties to
determine when it is “appropriate and desirable” to institute “measures for dealing
with such children without resorting to judicial proceedings.” 96
The CRC provision most directly related to the recruitment and use of child
soldiers is Article 38. Article 38 prohibits State Parties from recruiting anyone under
the age of fifteen into their armed forces and requires them to “take all feasible
measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not
take a direct part in hostilities.”97 This provision falls short in a number of respects.
In addition to ignoring the use of child soldiers by nonstate actors, Article 38 does
not protect children from serving in roles indirectly related to combat. It also does
not protect children who “volunteer” for service in armed conflicts. Recognizing
these deficiencies and the modern rise in the use of child soldiers around the world,
the CRC was amended in 2000 to include the Optional Protocol on the Involvement
of Children in Armed Conflict.98 The Optional Protocol is now the international

90 Id. art. 37(a).
91 Id.
92 Id. art. 40, ¶ 1.
93 See id. art. 40, ¶ 2(b)(i)–(vii).
94 Id. art. 40, ¶ 3(a). This wide grant of power to the CRC’s State Parties is not without limit.
General Comment 10 to the CRC adds that the age of twelve should be the absolute minimum age
of criminal responsibility. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10: Children’s
Rights in Juvenile Justice, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10 (Apr. 25, 2007).
95
A sampling of baseline ages of criminal responsibility over the past decade include:
seven (Switzerland, Nigeria, South Africa); ten (Australia, New Zealand); twelve
(Canada, Netherlands, Uganda); thirteen (France, Afghanistan); fourteen (Japan,
Germany, Austria, Italy, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone); fifteen (Sweden, Norway,
Denmark); sixteen (Spain, Portugal); and eighteen (Belgium, Brazil, Peru).
MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 104
(2012).
96 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 40(3)(b). This provision
suggests a variety of alternatives to judicial proceedings and institutional care, including “care,
guidance and supervision orders; counselling; probation; foster care; [and] education and
vocational training programmes.” Id. art. 40(4).
97 Id. art. 38, ¶¶ 2–3.
98 See Malone, supra note 84, at 601; Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 442–45.
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community’s main legal instrument addressing the use of children as soldiers, and it
has been ratified nearly as widely as the CRC. 99
Recognizing that the CRC’s standard for recruitment had not adequately
protected children, the Optional Protocol greatly strengthened the Convention by
amending the minimum age for compulsory recruitment. Under Articles 2 and 4 of
the Optional Protocol, both state and nonstate forces cannot forcibly recruit children
under the age of eighteen.100 While nonstate forces are also prohibited from
accepting voluntary recruits under the age of eighteen, 101 that rule does not
necessarily extend to State Parties. A loophole can be found in Article 3, which
requires States to “raise the minimum age for . . . voluntary recruitment” above
fifteen but sets no hard and fast line requiring the minimum age to exceed eighteen
years of age.102 Hypothetically, national armed forces could accept voluntary
recruits who are fifteen years and one day old so long as some of the “safeguards”
set out in Article 3 of the Optional Protocol are in place.103
Despite the confusing provisions regarding compulsory and voluntary
recruitment of children in these instruments, both Article 38 and the Optional
Protocol clearly emphasize the importance of rehabilitating child soldiers and
reintegrating them into their communities. Reiterating the Convention’s focus on
the best interests of the child, Article 39 of the CRC provides that “States Parties
shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery
and social reintegration of a child victim of . . . armed conflicts.”104 The Optional
Protocol builds on this provision, adding that “States Parties shall take all feasible
measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited or used in
hostilities . . . are demobilized” and given “all appropriate assistance for their
physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.” 105
C. The Beijing Rules
The U.N. Nations Standard Minimum Rules on the Administration of Juvenile
Justice, more commonly known as “the Beijing Rules,” is a set of guidelines for the
minimum treatment of children in the juvenile justice system. 106 While the Rules

99 One hundred and sixty-seven states are currently parties to the Optional Protocol; another
twelve have signed it but have not ratified it. Office of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for Children and Armed Conflict, Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict, UNITED NATIONS, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/tools-for-action/opac/
(last visited Dec. 17, 2018).
100 Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography,
arts. 2, 4, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (Mar. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Optional Protocol to the CRC].
101 Id. art 4, ¶ 1.
102 Id. art 3, ¶ 1.
103 See id. art. 3, ¶¶ 2–3.
104 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 39.
105 Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note 100, art. 6, ¶ 3; see also id. art. 7, ¶ 1 (requiring
State Parties to “cooperate in the implementation of the present Protocol, including in . . . the
rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons who are victims of acts contrary to this Protocol”).
106 Noëlle Quénivet, Does and Should International Law Prohibit the Prosecution of Children
for War Crimes?, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 433, 439 (2017). These guidelines were the product of a
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are not binding, they are meant to serve as a model to U.N. Member States. Several
of the basic principles set out in the Beijing Rules are relevant to the treatment of
child soldiers.
Like the Geneva Conventions and the CRC, the Beijing Rules fail to set a clear
minimum age of liability. Instead, the Rules broadly allow “those legal systems
recognizing the concept of the age of criminal responsibility for juveniles” to fix
liability at an age of their choice so long as it is not “too low.” 107
Though the Beijing Rules do not negate the capacity of young offenders to
commit offenses or remove a State’s ability to prosecute them, they repeatedly stress
that “[t]he juvenile justice system shall emphasize the well-being of the juvenile.”108
The Beijing Rules clearly favor diversion to community services over
institutionalization, which they describe as “a disposition of last resort and for the
minimum necessary period.”109 The Rules provide an extensive list of alternatives
to institutionalization that “shall be made available to the competent authority,”
including probation, community service, intermediate treatment, and group
counseling.110 Like Additional Protocol II and the CRC, the Beijing Rules also
enumerate a series of due process protections for children in the juvenile justice
system111 and expressly prohibit capital and corporal punishment. 112
III.

CHILD SOLDIERS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Much like the United Nation’s conventions and policy guidelines, the United
Nation’s international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court have
largely sidestepped the question of children’s culpability. This Part will discuss the
meeting of the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
in 1980. See Barry Goldson & John Muncie, Rethinking Youth Justice: Comparative Analysis,
International Human Rights and Research Evidence, 6 YOUTH JUST. 91, 96 (2006).
107 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The
Beijing Rules), ¶ 4.1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1985) [hereinafter Beijing Rules]. In
setting the minimum age of criminal responsibility, the Beijing Rules require States to “bear[] in
mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.” Id. Commentary to the Rule
explains that disparities in national ages of criminal responsibility are inevitable given cultural and
historical differences between States and will range “from 7 years to 18 years or above.” See id.
¶ 2, cmt. 2.2.
108 Id. ¶ 5.1; see also id. ¶ 17.1(d) (“The well-being of the juvenile shall be the guiding factor
in the consideration of her or his case.”). Unlike other instruments of international law, the Beijing
Rules also instruct juvenile justice systems to take considerations of a child’s individual
circumstances and the circumstances of the offense into account. See, e.g., id. ¶ 5.1 (“[A]ny
reaction to juvenile offenders shall always be in proportion to the circumstances of both the
offenders and the offence.”).
109 Id. ¶ 19.1; see also id. ¶ 18.1 (stating that institutionalization should be avoided “to the
greatest extent possible”).
110 Id. ¶ 18.1(a)–(h).
111 Id. ¶ 7.1 (providing that “at all stages of proceedings” a series of “[b]asic procedural
safeguards such as the presumption of innocence, the right to be notified of the charges, the right
to remain silent, the right to counsel, the right to the presence of a parent or guardian, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses and the right to appeal” must be available to the juvenile).
112 Id. ¶¶ 17.2, 17.3.
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Nuremberg Tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
and the International Criminal Court and the varying degrees to which they have
addressed the criminal responsibility of children.
A. Early International Criminal Tribunals
Despite the fact that thousands of child soldiers participated in armed conflicts
throughout the twentieth century, the earliest international criminal tribunals
completely failed to address children’s culpability. Soldiers below the age of
eighteen fought for both sides in World War II, but no mention was made of the age
at which criminal responsibility began in the Nuremberg Charter.113 The Nuremberg
Military Tribunal, the international community’s first ad hoc court, did not charge
anyone under the age of eighteen for crimes committed during the war. 114
For several decades after World War II, “international criminal law largely
remained silent on the question of the penal responsibility of minors for
extraordinary international crimes.”115 When the U.N. Security Council established
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the first
court of its kind in half a century, it again failed to address the culpability of child
soldiers in its charter.116 The two youngest people prosecuted by the ICTY, Anto
Furundžija and Dražen Erdemović, were both twenty-three years old at the time of
the commission of their crimes.117 When the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) was established the following year, the Security Council again
offered no guidance regarding the age of criminal responsibility. 118 Though children
as young as five were accused of participating in the genocide, the tribunal left it to
Rwanda’s national courts to decide whether young people should be prosecuted for
their offenses.119 Like the ICTY, the ICTR did not prosecute anyone who was under

113 Malone, supra note 84, at 605. See generally Charter of the International Military
Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 284 (limiting the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to
“major war criminals” but failing to impose a minimum age of liability). There was also no mention
of the age at which criminal responsibility began in Control Council Law No. 10 or Control Council
Ordinance No. 7. DRUMBL, supra note 95, at 117.
114 DRUMBL, supra note 95, at 117. The closest the Nuremberg Tribunal came to the issue of
children’s culpability was during its prosecution of Baldur von Schirach, a Nazi German politician
who was the head of the Hitler Youth from 1931 to 1940. Id. “Although the [International Military
Tribunal] prosecuted Baldur von Schirach for inter alia his use of the Hitler Youth, it did not
address crimes committed by the youth themselves.” Id. Relatedly, the Tokyo Tribunal only
conducted trials of the Japanese leadership and did not prosecute any minors. Id.
115 Id. at 118.
116 See generally Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
117 Quénivet, supra note 106, at 446.
118 See generally Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
119 National institutions in Rwanda have tried multiple people who were under the age of
eighteen at the time of the genocide for their involvement therein. See infra notes 190–1 and
accompanying text.
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the age of eighteen at the time they committed their offense. 120 In the absence of
language to the contrary, both the ICTY and the ICTR’s statutes could be interpreted
to permit the prosecution of child soldiers for their crimes. 121
B. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s civil war was “one of the most brutal in Africa.” 122 Over the
course of the eleven-year conflict, half of Sierra Leone’s population was displaced,
thousands of children were separated from their families, over fifty thousand people
were killed, and thousands of people were mutilated. 123 While these statistics are
jarring, what truly set this conflict apart from others was the unprecedented use of
child soldiers.124 Throughout the conflict, both the national government’s army and
the infamous Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) rebel forces125 placed children as
young as seven on the front lines. At any one time, an estimated five thousand
children were serving as soldiers, fighting on both sides of the war. 126 Children
“spread unspeakable fear throughout” the country and “were responsible for
thousands of murders, mutilations, and rapes, and for torture, forced labor, and
sexual slavery.”127 Under the influence of narcotics and alcohol, children were

120 UNICEF, CHILDREN AND TRUTH COMMISSIONS 17 (2010). Given the uncertainty in the
statute, the ICTR’s lead prosecutor “decided that children aged 14 to 18 would not be tried by the
ICTR or called as witnesses to testify.” Id.
121 While some argue that these omissions from the ICTY and the ICTR’s jurisdiction were
intentional and suggest that the courts would be entitled to prosecute a minor, “others have argued
that such a deliberate omission ‘seems to have been premised on a belief that such a provision was
unnecessary as no such prosecutions would take place.’” Alice S. Debarre, Rehabilitation and
Reintegration of Juvenile War Criminals: A De Facto Ban on Their Criminal Prosecution?, 44
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 6 (2015) (quoting Happold, supra note 76, at 84–85).
122 Ismene Zarifis, Sierra Leone’s Search for Justice and Accountability of Child Soldiers, 9
HUM.
RTS.
BRIEF
18,
18
(2002),
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&
httpsredir=1&article=1459&context=hrbrief. For a brief overview of the origins of the conflict and
its ultimate conclusion in 2001, see The Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr.
11, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/11/armed-conflict-sierra-leone.
123 Ramgoolie, supra note 40, at 147.
124 Id. at 146; see also ROSEN, supra note 10, at 2 (“Sierra Leone is the poster-child case of
the modern child-soldier crisis.”); Ramgoolie, supra note 40, at 147 (“Child combatants played an
unprecedented, large, and violent role in the Sierra Leone civil war . . . .”). For the story of one
child soldier’s abduction, service in the RUF, and eventual rehabilitation, see ISHMAEL BEAH, A
LONG WAY GONE: MEMOIRS OF A BOY SOLDIER (2007).
125 The RUF committed countless gross human rights violations over the course of Sierra
Leone’s civil war and “evolved into one of the worst agents of terror in contemporary Africa.”
ROSEN, supra note 10, at 60. “Widespread and indiscriminate murder, rape, and amputation of
limbs were signature crimes of the RUF.” Zarifis, supra note 122, at 19.
126 ROSEN, supra note 10, at 61. By some estimates, half of all RUF combatants were between
the ages of eight and fourteen. Id. at 62; see also Goodwin, supra note 68 (estimating that children
made up between forty and fifty percent of the RUF’s total force of around 15,000). On the
Government side, officials have admitted that children composed a fifth of their forces. Id.
127 ROSEN, supra note 10, at 58.
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easily manipulated into committing many of the most atrocious murders,
amputations, and mutilations during the civil war. 128
After observing the seriousness of the situation in Sierra Leone, the U.N.
Security Council took its first major step toward the creation of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone (SCSL) when it unanimously passed Security Council Resolution
1315 (“Resolution 1315”) in 2000.129 Resolution 1315 proposed a novel structure
for the SCSL. Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which were established pursuant to
Security Council resolutions and granted Chapter VII powers, the Security Council
proposed a domestic-international hybrid tribunal that would be created pursuant to
a treaty-based agreement.130 The proposed court would incorporate aspects of both
international and domestic law and would be jointly administered by the Sierra
Leonean government and the United Nations. 131
Resolution 1315 authorized the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to negotiate an
agreement with Sierra Leone’s government to create this independent special
court.132 Given the pervasive use of child soldiers throughout the conflict and the
scale of the atrocities they committed, the criminal culpability of young people was
one of the most contentious issues during those negotiations. 133 Sierra Leone’s
government and numerous Sierra Leoneans who had suffered at the hands of child
soldiers felt that justice could not be served unless some children were put on trial
for their crimes.134
Many international humanitarian groups and U.N.
representatives, on the other hand, lobbied against prosecuting anyone who was
below the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes. 135
In the report he prepared for the Security Council, Kofi Annan prefaced his
discussion of this contentious issue by stating that “most if not all of these children
have been subjected to a process of psychological and physical abuse and duress
which has transformed them from victims into perpetrators.”136 He went on to
clarify that “although the children of Sierra Leone may be among those who have
committed the worst crimes, they are to be regarded first and foremost as victims.” 137
Nonetheless, Secretary-General Annan ultimately recommended that “in view of the
most horrific aspects of the child combatancy in Sierra Leone,” the court “would not
necessarily exclude persons of young age from [its] jurisdiction.” 138

128 See Mark Iacono, Note, The Child Soldiers of Sierra Leone: Are They Accountable for
Their Actions in War?, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 445, 449 (2003); see also DRUMBL,
supra note 95, at 80 (“In Sierra Leone, . . . commonly used drugs included cannabis, cocaine,
amphetamines, and barbiturates. At times, powdered cocaine or heroin was mixed with gunpowder,
resulting in a concoction known as brown-brown.”).
129 See generally S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
130 See generally id.
131 Id. ¶ 2.
132 Id. ¶ 1.
133 See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone, ¶¶ 32–38, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
134 See id. ¶ 35.
135 See id.
136 Id. ¶ 32.
137 Id. ¶ 7.
138 Id. ¶ 36.
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After extensive negotiations, Sierra Leone and the United Nations agreed upon
the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone in January 2002 (“the Statute”).139
The court was given “the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra
Leonean law.”140 Adopting the Secretary-General’s recommendation, the court’s
jurisdiction was extended to persons who were between the ages of fifteen and
eighteen at the time of the commission of their crimes. 141 It was the first time in
history that an international tribunal was legally empowered to prosecute individuals
who were under the age of eighteen. The Statute added additional safeguards for
juvenile offenders, requiring that:
Should any person who was at the time of the alleged commission of the crime
between 15 and 18 years of age come before the Court, he or she shall be treated
with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into account his or her young age and
the desirability of promoting his or her rehabilitation, reintegration into and
assumption of a constructive role in society, and in accordance with international
142
human rights standards, in particular the rights of the child.

Though juvenile offenders could be subjected to a full trial under this
provision, the Statute granted them the presumption of rehabilitation and
reintegration into Sierra Leonean society and immunized them from
imprisonment.143
Although the Statute left the door open for children to be tried for their crimes,
the Prosecutor for the Court, David Crane, quickly made it very clear that he would
never prosecute anyone under the age of eighteen.144 In a 2002 press release, Crane
said, “[t]he children of Sierra Leone have suffered enough both as victims and
perpetrators. I am not interested in prosecuting children. I want to prosecute the
people who forced thousands of children to commit unspeakable crimes.” 145
Consistent with his word, the SCSL became the first tribunal to convict individuals

139 Bald, supra note 15, at 560.
140 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1, ¶ 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145
[hereinafter SCSL Statute].
141 Id. art. 7, ¶ 1. It was never made explicitly clear why the minimum age of criminal
responsibility was fixed at fifteen, but:
[I]t seems that the intention was to mirror the provisions on the recruitment and use
of child soldiers in the two [Additional Protocols] and the CRC, on the ground that
if children under fifteen are too young to be recruited, they must be too young to
be held criminally accountable for their actions.
Happold, supra note 76, at 80.
142 SCSL Statute, supra note 140, art. 7, ¶ 1.
143 See id. art. 7, ¶ 2. The Court was limited to providing rehabilitative sentences, including
“care guidance and supervision orders, community service orders, counselling, foster care,
correctional, educational and vocational training programmes, approved schools and, as
appropriate, any programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or programmes of
child protection agencies.” Id.
144 See DRUMBL, supra note 95, at 123.
145 Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Public Affairs Office, Special Court
Prosecutor
Says
He
Will
Not
Prosecute
Children
(Nov.
2,
2002),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/OTP/prosecutor-110202.pdf (statement of David Crane,
Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone).
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for the recruitment and use of child soldiers. 146 No one who was below the age of
eighteen at the time of their crimes was prosecuted. 147
C. The International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (ICC), a permanent international tribunal
with jurisdiction over “[t]he crime of genocide; [c]rimes against humanity; [w]ar
crimes; [and t]he crime of aggression,” was officially established pursuant to the
Rome Statute in 2002.148 In striking contrast to the Nuremberg Charter and the
statutes creating the ICTY and the ICTR, the Rome Statute contains numerous
references to children.149 Child-specific provisions occur throughout the Rome
Statute’s list of substantive offenses in Articles 6, 7, and 8. 150 Building off of the
innovative provisions developed for the SCSL, Article 8 classifies the act of
“[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces
or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities” as a war crime. 151
Since the Rome Statute came into force in 2002, “crimes committed against
children during armed conflict have figured prominently in indictments issued by
the ICC.”152 In the first case before the ICC, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a former
warlord from the Democratic Republic of Congo, was found guilty on charges of
conscripting, enlisting, and using child soldiers under the age of fifteen to actively
participate in the rebel forces under his command.153 Building on this precedent, the

146 See ROSEN, supra note 10, at 146. For a list of the individuals who were charged with
unlawfully recruiting children under the age of fifteen, see id. at 147; see also Steven Freeland,
Mere Children or Weapons of War—Child Soldiers and International Law, 29 U. LA VERNE L.
REV. 19, 20–21 (2008) (describing the SCSL’s prosecution and sentencing of RUF leaders, the
former President of Liberia, and others on charges of conscripting or enlisting children into armed
forces and using them to participate actively in hostilities).
147 See DRUMBL, supra note 95, at 123.
148 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
149 See, e.g., id. pmbl. (“[D]uring this century millions of children . . . have been victims of
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”).
150 Note that, despite its groundbreaking inclusion of children in many of its substantive and
procedural provisions, the Rome Statute does not contain a definition of a “child.”
151 Rome Statute, supra note 148, art. 8, ¶ 2(e)(vii). The Rome Statute classifies the act of
conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen as a war crime in both international armed
conflicts and in “armed conflict not of an international character.” Id. art. 8, ¶ 2(c); see also id. art.
8, ¶ 2(b)(xxvi). Recognizing the additional atrocities that young girls conscripted into armed
groups face, the Rome Statute also makes “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, [and] forced
pregnancy” a war crime. Id. art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(xxii).
152 Office of the Special Representative of the Sec’y-Gen. for Children & Armed Conflict,
Role
of
the
International
Criminal
Court,
UNITED
NATIONS,
https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/role-of-the-icc/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2018)
[hereinafter Role of the ICC].
153 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Summary of the Judgment
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 14, 2012). In this groundbreaking decision, the ICC also
acknowledged “that the distinction between voluntary and forced recruitment is artificial and
recognized the broader interpretation of the definition of child soldiers to include girls and boys
who serve in support roles.” Role of the ICC, supra note 152.
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ICC has prosecuted other individuals for the exploitation of child soldiers in the
Democratic Republic of Congo,154 Uganda,155 and the Central African Republic.156
In addition to creating a forum for prosecuting those responsible for
conscripting children, the Rome Statute clearly excludes young people from the
jurisdiction of the ICC. Article 26 provides that “[t]he Court shall have no
jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged
commission of a crime.”157 Article 26 “elicited only brief discussion at the Rome
Conference, where delegates were reluctant to engage with the conundrum of
children as atrocity perpetrators.”158 Given the wide-ranging ages of criminal
responsibility among nations, the drafters decided that it was best to leave the
decision to prosecute children for crimes proscribed by the Rome Statute to state
discretion.159 Other reasons the drafters of the Rome Statute cited for excluding
children from the ICC’s jurisdiction included “resource constraints, curial
competence regarding juvenile justice, sentencing issues, and the ability to provide
specialized detention facilities for juveniles and properly trained staff.”160
While Article 26 clearly excludes the ICC’s jurisdiction over child soldiers, it
does not close the question of their culpability before other international tribunals.
“Indeed, Article 26 was arguably not based on the belief that children under
eighteen” are incapable of committing war crimes or should not be prosecuted for
their actions, “but rather on the sense that this decision should be left to state
discretion.”161

154 See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74
of the Statute (Mar. 7, 2014); Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Dec. 18, 2012).
155 See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05 (ongoing); Prosecutor v. Ongwen,
Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Against Dominic Ongwen
(Mar. 23, 2016) (ongoing).
156 See generally Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, Judgment Pursuant to
Article 74 of the Statute (Oct. 19, 2016); Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 21, 2016).
157 Rome Statute, supra note 148, art. 26. Given this limit on the ICC’s jurisdiction, the
closest the ICC has come to prosecuting a child soldier is its ongoing prosecution of Dominic
Ongwen, a prior commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army. See DARIJA MARKOVIĆ, CHILD
SOLDIERS:
VICTIMS
OR
WAR
CRIMINALS?
12–13
(2015),
http://www.raun.org/uploads/4/7/5/4/47544571/paper__2_.pdf. Ongwen was indicted for the commission of war
crimes and crimes against humanity in Uganda that he committed when he was about twenty-nine
years old. Id. However, Ongwen was a child soldier before rising through the ranks of the LRA;
like so many other Ugandan children, he was abducted by the LRA in broad daylight while walking
to school. Id.
158 DRUMBL, supra note 95, at 119.
159 Id. at 121. Some have argued that this decision “meshes with . . . Article 17 of the Rome
Statute, [which] provides that national jurisdictions shall have the first opportunity to investigate
and prosecute allegations of Rome Statute crimes.” Id.
160 Id. at 120.
161 Debarre, supra note 121, at 7.
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CLOSING THE GAP

Though recent international efforts mark clear advancements in the protection
of children’s rights, one major gap persists: clear law relating to the culpability and
prosecution of child soldiers. While the international community has explicitly and
repeatedly condemned the enlistment and use of child soldiers in hostilities, it
remains unclear whether children can or should be prosecuted for international
crimes they commit in the context of armed conflicts. Apart from the ICC and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, no international convention or court has explicitly
addressed this issue.
The body of law surveyed in Parts II and III of this Essay demonstrates that
there is a clear disconnect between international criminal law on paper and
international criminal law in practice. Relevant conventions and U.N. resolutions
that seem to suggest that child soldiers may be legally prosecuted by international
tribunals simultaneously show a clear preference for rehabilitation and reintegration.
Similarly, the statutes for ad hoc and special courts have allowed for the prosecution
of children, but the prosecutorial strategies and practices of these tribunals show a
clear reluctance to try them. “Despite the absence of a[n explicit] ban on the criminal
prosecution of child soldiers, none have ever been prosecuted by an international
court.”162 As the number of children serving in armed forces across the world
continues to rise, this gap in international criminal law must be closed.
In order to find the appropriate balance between treating child soldiers as
victims or perpetrators, we must focus on two clear themes within this fragmented
body of law. First, when dealing with child soldiers, the focus must be on the best
interests of the child.163 This theme weaves its way throughout all of these
conventions, resolutions, and statutes, finding its expression in jurisdictional
limitations,164 explicit due process protections for children, 165 limits on sentences of
imprisonment,166 and prohibitions on capital punishment. 167 The second theme is
the obligation to rehabilitate child soldiers and reintegrate them into their
communities, regardless of the crimes they have committed. 168 Given these
overarching themes, a strong argument can be made for the conclusion that

162 Id. at 2. Some have gone so far as to argue that this tradition of excluding children from
prosecution in international tribunals in the absence of a jurisdictional ban rises to the level of a
“customary norm of international law.” Id. at 10.
163 See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 3.
164 See, e.g., SCSL Statute, supra note 140, art. 1, ¶ 1, art. 7, ¶ 1 (limiting the Court’s power
to prosecuting “persons who bear the greatest responsibility” for violations of international and
domestic law); Rome Statute, supra note 148, art. 26.
165 See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, arts. 37, 40; Beijing Rules,
supra note 107, ¶ 7.
166 See, e.g., SCSL Statute, supra note 140, art. 7, ¶ 2; Convention on the Rights of the Child,
supra note 85 arts. 37(a)–(b); Beijing Rules, supra note 107, ¶¶ 18.1, 19.1.
167 See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 37(a); Beijing Rules,
supra note 107, ¶ 17.2; Additional Protocol I, supra note 73, art. 77; Additional Protocol II, supra
note 77, art. 6, ¶ 4; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 71, art. 68.
168 See, e.g., SCSL Statute, supra note 140, art. 7, ¶ 1; Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra
note 100, art. 6, ¶¶ 1, 3, 7; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, arts. 39, 40, ¶ 1;
Beijing Rules, supra note 107, ¶ 18.1(a)–(h).
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international tribunals should not prosecute children below the age of eighteen for
their crimes.
A. Fixing the Age of Criminal Liability at Eighteen
In the future, international courts should follow the lead of the ICC and institute
an absolute prohibition on the prosecution of children who committed crimes when
they were under the age of eighteen.169 Given difficulties in establishing the mental
culpability of children, the importance of a child’s best interests, and the realities of
life as a child soldier, it is best to leave prosecution of children for crimes committed
in armed conflicts to national courts and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions.
1. Choosing Eighteen as the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility
Setting the international age of culpability at eighteen would be consistent with
existing law. Although national approaches to the minimum age of criminal
responsibility vary widely, this limit is consistent with the CRC, which defines a
child as anyone under the age of eighteen. 170 This approach also aligns with the
ICC, which excludes anyone who was below that age at the commission of their
crimes from its jurisdiction.171 Setting the minimum age of criminal responsibility
at eighteen is also consistent with the shift in international law toward prohibiting
the recruitment and use of children under that age in armed conflicts. 172
Though setting a minimum age of criminal responsibility may seem arbitrary,
it is crucial that a precise age be chosen. While some have argued that it would be
best to take subjective factors such as the accused’s actual maturity, personality, and
capacity for understanding the consequences of his or her actions into account, 173
such an approach would be highly inconsistent. Objectively drawing the line at
eighteen may be over- or underinclusive in terms of moral culpability, but a
169 Though a revision of one or more of the conventions and U.N. Resolutions discussed in
this Essay could also bring clarity to this issue, that may not be advisable. All of the legal
instruments covered in this Essay govern the rights of children at both the international and the
national level. Given the wide-ranging ages of criminal responsibility among nations, it is best to
anticipate that some children will be prosecuted for domestic or international crimes at the national
level and will need those protections. Providing states with guiding due process and rehabilitation
principles will serve as a means of protecting children who are subject to state prosecution.
170 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 1. Setting the minimum age
of criminal responsibility at age eighteen is also consistent with the CRC’s “underlying
rehabilitative goals,” as it will maximize opportunities for young offenders to access rehabilitative
services. Grossman, supra note 10, at 347.
171 See Rome Statute, supra note 148, art. 26.
172 See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text (describing the amendments made to the
CRC by the Optional Protocol); see also supra notes 141–47 and accompanying text (explaining
that, in practice, the SCSL did not prosecute anyone under the age of fifteen despite the opportunity
created by the SCSL Statute).
173 See, e.g., Erin Lafayette, Note, The Prosecution of Child Soldiers: Balancing
Accountability with Justice, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 297, 304 (2013) (“To determine when a child
has the sufficient metal capacity to . . . be held responsible for[] his actions in armed conflict, an
adolescent’s right to form and express his own opinions must be examined in light of his
psychological development and cultural perspective.”).
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retrospective, case-by-case assessment of a child’s maturity at the time they
committed a crime would be incredibly imprecise. Setting a precise age, below
which individuals cannot be prosecuted, will ensure that all children are subject to
equal responsibility under the law.
Choosing the age of eighteen as the lower limit for criminal accountability also
reflects the state of children’s ongoing psychological and moral development prior
to that age. While all individuals mature at different rates, children generally do
“not have the requisite mental, physical, or moral development to make a logical
decision regarding [their] participation in [a] conflict” before the age of eighteen. 174
Numerous studies have established that children “lack the capacity to determine their
best interests, to independently form opinions or to analyze competing
ideologies.”175 Children are also prone to “irrational, emotion-driven behavior,”176
and generally lack the mental maturity “to act independently or appreciate the rights
of others.”177 Because they lack the necessary mental and moral maturity to make
informed decisions, children are “more easily coerced or influenced into committing
atrocities” and more prone to acquiesce to outside pressures. 178
2. Meeting the Mens Rea Standard
Setting the minimum age of criminal responsibility at eighteen will also
alleviate difficulties related to establishing a child’s moral culpability. To establish
a child soldier’s criminal liability, it is not enough to simply demonstrate that he or
she committed a particular act. Each crime requires a union of actus reus—the
physical act of the crime—and the requisite mens rea—the particular state of mind
at the time of the crime. As discussed in the subsection IV(A)(1), “studies
demonstrate that, up to a certain age, a child is not fully able to understand his or her
acts.”179 As a consequence of their ongoing psychological development, many child
soldiers do not have the capacity to commit particular crimes with the required
intent. Although “the exact age at which an individual can commit a criminal act
with the required mens rea element is not clearly determined,” it is far easier for a
court to presume that an adult acted with the requisite moral culpability than to
determine the state of mind of a soldier under the age of eighteen.180 The difficulty
of establishing that a child acted with the requisite mens rea is further compounded
by the reality that most child soldiers are severely abused and forced to commit
crimes under duress or under the influence of desensitizing drugs or alcohol.181
International crimes have particularly onerous mens rea requirements and it
would be difficult to demonstrate that child soldiers had the mental capacity to

174 Id. at 303.
175 See Abbott, supra note 1, at 517.
176 David Pimentel, The Widening Maturity Gap: Trying and Punishing Juveniles as Adults
in an Era of Extended Adolescence, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 71, 84 (2013).
177 Grossman, supra note 10, at 347.
178 Debarre, supra note 121, at 2–3.
179 Fanny Leveau, Liability of Child Soldiers Under International Criminal Law, 4 OSGOODE
HALL REV. L. & POL’Y 36, 38 (2013).
180 Id.
181 See supra Section I.D.
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commit them.182 Some international crimes require a special intent in addition to the
crime’s traditional mens rea requirement. To meet the legal standard for the
international crime of genocide, for example, it would have to be shown that a child
acted with a specific “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group.”183 On top of that, it would have to be shown that the child had
the intent to commit one of the five underlying acts that constitute genocide.184 Other
international crimes, such as crimes against humanity, require knowledge of the
existence of particular circumstances. To demonstrate that a child soldier committed
a crime against humanity, it would have to be shown that the child committed the
act “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack.” 185
3. Safeguarding the Best Interests of Children
Excluding children from the jurisdiction of international tribunals will also
safeguard their best interests. Participation in a criminal trial could be very
psychologically damaging for a former child soldier. Forcing a child to recount their
involvement in atrocities could threaten their psychological healing, cause them
further trauma, and delay their return to any sense of normalcy. 186 Forcing a child
soldier to stand trial would also leave them at a higher risk of stigmatization and
make it more difficult for them to reintegrate into society. 187 If a child was formally
charged as a war criminal, “any community doubt concerning [their] actions [would]
be eviscerated, and it [could] be impossible to convince [their] communities to
accept them.”188
There are also practical reasons for excluding children from the jurisdiction of
international tribunals. If children know that they could be subject to prosecution
they may be more reluctant to disarm. 189 In addition, all international tribunals are
limited in their time, funding, and resources. Given these limitations, international
tribunals could not necessarily uphold the procedural safeguards for children that are
required by international law. Given the number of children involved in armed
conflict, some have argued that opening the door to their prosecution could
overwhelm courts. However, that is unlikely to be the case. Historically, only a
fraction of the individuals who are most culpable in the wake of a conflict are
indicted and prosecuted by international tribunals. It is unlikely that children would
be among those who are responsible for the most atrocious crimes. It is also unlikely

182 Some have “argued that international crimes have such onerous mens rea requirements
that children will always lack the capacity to commit them.” See, e.g., Happold, supra note 76, at
72.
183 Rome Statute, supra note 148, art. 6.
184 Id. art. 6(a)–(e).
185 Id. art. 7, ¶ 1.
186 See Debarre, supra note 121, at 17.
187 See id.
188 Sara A. Ward, Note, Criminalizing the Victim: Why the Legal Community Must Fight to
Ensure That Child Soldier Victims Are Not Prosecuted as War Criminals, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
821, 833 (2012).
189 Ramgoolie, supra note 41, at 156.
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that a prosecutor would consider it necessary to put their already limited time and
resources toward a child’s trial.
4. Leaving Determinations of Culpability to Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions and Domestic Courts
Those who favor the prosecution of child soldiers have argued that their trials
will provide communities with a much-needed sense of finality and give those who
have suffered years of violence and fear the justice they deserve. 190 However,
prosecuting child soldiers at the international level is not the only means of bringing
about the “justice” so many people demand. In multiple instances, Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions (“TRCs”) have proven themselves to be an effective
means of bringing communities a sense of closure in the aftermath of a conflict.191
Unlike criminal trials, TRCs do not play a “punitive, prosecutorial role.”192 Instead,
TRCs “allow[] perpetrators and victims of human rights violations to come forward
and account for their actions in the spirit of promoting national peace and
reconciliation.”193 TRCs such as the one established in Sierra Leone have been an
“effective means of providing a non-judicial and non-punitive approach to
accountability for child soldiers.”194 In addition to promoting healing within a
community, TRCs also foster the child’s “total rehabilitation and social reintegration
in accordance with” the overriding goals of the CRC,195 the Optional Protocol to the
CRC,196 and the Beijing Rules.197
The jurisdictional limitation proposed in this Essay also would not inhibit the
ability of domestic courts to prosecute children who were under the age of eighteen
at the time of the commission of their crimes. Given the highly varied conceptions
of childhood among cultures and the wide-ranging minimum ages of criminal
190 Other arguments in favor of prosecuting children have major flaws. For instance, some
have argued that, in the absence of judicial accountability, the leaders of armed groups will be more
likely to encourage children to commit atrocious crimes. See, e.g., Megan Nobert, Children at
War: The Criminal Responsibility of Child Soldiers, 2011 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION
1, 1; Lafayette, supra note 173, at 311. The leaders of these armed groups are individuals who are
willing to kidnap children and murder defenseless civilians to accomplish their agendas. Simply
put, there is not much they are unwilling to do; it is probably safe to say that the remote possibility
of prosecution is far from their minds in the heat of an armed conflict. The adults who recruit and
utilize child soldiers view them as dispensable manpower, and it would be far more effective to
subject them to prosecution for their actions than the children they employ. Others have argued
that, in the absence of prosecution, “mayhem and social disorder will result.” See, e.g., Joshua A.
Romero, Note, The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Juvenile Soldier Dilemma, 2 NW. J.
INT’L HUM. RTS. 2, 11 (2004). Should that be a legitimate concern in the wake of a conflict, a
nation could prosecute child soldiers at the national level (as discussed in this Section).
191 See Ward, supra note 188, at 835.
192 Zarifis, supra note 122, at 20.
193 Id.
194 Ward, supra note 188 at 835.
195 Zarifis, supra note 122, at 21; see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note
85, arts. 39, 40, ¶ 1.
196 See Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note 100, arts. 6, ¶ 3, 7, ¶ 1.
197 See Beijing Rules, supra note 107, ¶ 18.1(a)–(h); see also SCSL Statute, supra note 140,
art. 7, ¶ 1.
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responsibility across nations, domestic courts are a much more appropriate forum
for such prosecutions.
Examples of prosecutions of child soldiers for war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or other international crimes in national courts are extremely rare, but not
nonexistent. After the Rwandan genocide, “the genocide victims’ desire for
retribution in the name of justice . . . resulted in the arrest and detention of” over one
thousand children.198 It was the first time in history that children were imprisoned
for genocide, but very few of them were ever tried for their crimes. 199 In 2000, the
Democratic Republic of Congo executed a fourteen-year-old child soldier for his
involvement in the violence that has long gripped that country.200 When the
Democratic Republic of Congo imposed death sentences on another four child
soldiers between the ages of fourteen and sixteen the following year, a number of
Nongovernmental Organizations (“NGOs”) intervened.201 After much lobbying, the
sentences were not carried out.202 Similarly, in 2002 the Ugandan government
brought treason charges against two former Lord’s Resistance Army fighters who
were fourteen and sixteen years old.203 Again, NGOs intervened and successfully
pressured the government to withdraw the charges. 204
Western countries have also tried child soldiers for the commission of
international crimes. In a highly publicized case in 2010, the U.S. Military
Commission tried a former child soldier for Al-Qaeda, Omar Khadr, for murder and
attempted murder in violation of the laws of war. 205 Khadr had thrown a grenade in
Afghanistan that killed an American soldier and injured two others. 206 When Khadr
challenged his detention, the Commission determined that “neither customary
international law nor international treaties binding upon the United States prohibit
the trial of a person for alleged violations of the law of nations committed when he
was 15 years of age.”207
5. Viewing Child Soldiers as Victims
Given the realities of life as a child soldier described in Part I, it is far more
appropriate to view these children as the victims of violence rather than as its
perpetrators. Children are more vulnerable than any other age group, and armed
groups exploit characteristics inextricably linked to their childhood to turn them into
vicious fighters. After they are separated from their families, child soldiers are
subject to beatings, routine punishments, forced labor, and sexual exploitation. They
198 Chen Reis, Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of Prosecuting
Children for Participation in Internal Armed Conflict, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 629, 630
(1997).
199 Cf. id. at 629–30.
200 Happold, supra note 76, at 71.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Debarre, supra note 121, at 8–9.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 9 (quoting EUGENE R. FIDELL ET AL., MILITARY JUSTICE: CASES AND MATERIAL
¶ 18 (2d ed. 2012)).
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are systematically brainwashed by adults until their ethics and moral values are so
distorted that they lose any sense of who they were before their involvement in the
conflict. Most of their crimes are committed under the threat of injury or death, and
many act under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs or alcohol. It goes without
saying that children who are forcibly recruited do not exercise their consent to serve
in an armed conflict, but “voluntary” recruitment is also coupled with hidden forms
of coercion. More often than not, children who voluntarily join armed forces are
driven to do so in order to fulfill their basic needs, and they rarely understand the
gravity of what they are signing themselves up for. Setting the minimum age of
criminal responsibility at eighteen will reflect these realities of life as a child soldier.
Setting the minimum age of criminal responsibility at eighteen will also ensure
that, in the wake of an armed conflict, the focus is on rehabilitating and reintegrating
former child soldiers rather than on prosecuting them. 208 Because participation in
“[a]rmed conflict affects all aspects of child development—physical, mental and
emotional,” effective rehabilitative services are crucial to helping former child
soldiers realize that their lives do not need to be driven by violence.209 Studies have
shown that, without effective rehabilitative services, disarmed children are more
likely to drift into a life of further violence and crime, and will often rejoin their
comrades and take up arms.210 Providing former child soldiers with access to an
education, job training, or work programs can break this cycle and help them
“disengage from the idea that violence is a legitimate means of achieving one’s
aims.”211 In addition, education can “normalize life” for a former child soldier, help
them develop healthy peer relationships, and improve their self-esteem.212
Reintegration programs can also help children reestablish contact with their families
and communities. “[A]t the end of a conflict, a child’s rehabilitation is often best
promoted by reuniting them with their family and community, and reintegrating the
familiar local cultures and traditions into their daily life.” 213 Taken together, these
efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate former child soldiers will help them resume life
within the community and “channel [their] energy, ideas and experience” into
positive contributions to “their new, post-conflict society.”214

208 Given the repeated emphasis in U.N. Conventions, resolutions, and court statutes on
reintegrating and rehabilitating child soldiers, some have gone so far as to argue that “there is a
customary international law that requires juveniles responsible for having committed war crimes to
be rehabilitated and reintegrated.” Id. at 15.
209 Machel Report, supra note 16, ¶ 166.
210 Reis, supra note 198, at 648; see also Sierra Leone Rebels Forcefully Recruit Child
Soldiers: RUF Targets Children for Fighting, Forced Labor, and Sexual Exploitation, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (May 31, 2000), https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/05/31/sierra-leone-rebels-forcefullyrecruit-child-soldiers (telling the stories of Sierra Leonean children who were lured back to the
RUF after demobilizing).
211 Machel Report, supra note 16, ¶ 57.
212 Id. ¶ 54.
213 Lafayette, supra note 173, at 309.
214 Machel Report, supra note 16, ¶ 57.

126

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[VOL. 94:2

B. Establishing a Distinct Legal Standard for Hybrid Tribunals
While the default should be to exclude children from prosecution in
international courts, difficulties could arise in the formation of hybrid internationaldomestic tribunals. As the United Nation’s experience negotiating the creation of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone demonstrated,215 some nations with minimum
ages of criminal responsibility below eighteen may insist on holding child soldiers
accountable for their crimes. While the aim should always be to exclude children
from a hybrid tribunal’s jurisdiction, there may be cases where it is necessary to hold
children accountable in order to legitimize the court and its mission. In such cases,
a firm legal standard distinguishing children from adults must be put in place.
Building off of the agreement reached between Sierra Leone and the United
Nations, only those children who are responsible for the greatest violations of
international law—namely war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide—
should be subject to a hybrid court’s jurisdiction. This limitation will exclude child
soldiers who did not take an active part in hostilities from the court’s jurisdiction.
Since the vast majority of child soldiers are not in leadership roles and are not
responsible for committing crimes on a massive scale, this limitation will also shield
almost all children from criminal responsibility. In addition, the minimum age of
criminal culpability should not be set lower than fifteen. Multiple provisions of
international law have established fifteen as the minimum age to legally recruit and
use children in armed forces, including Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions216 and the CRC (prior to its amendment by the Optional Protocol).217
If children under the age of fifteen are considered too young to be recruited by armed
groups, they must be too young to be held criminally accountable for their actions.
Finally, additional safeguards should be put in place to guarantee that children
accused of committing atrocities had the ability to understand the consequences of
their actions and form the requisite intent. In addition to demonstrating that a child
had the requisite moral culpability to commit the crimes he or she was accused of, it
should be shown that the child voluntarily joined the armed forces.
In addition to the array of due process protections for children enumerated in
Additional Protocol II,218 the CRC,219 and the Beijing Rules,220 the statute for a
hybrid tribunal should allow a child’s age and circumstances to serve as mitigating
factors and clearly list available defenses. Given the fact that many of the offenses
children commit are the product of coercion or manipulation by adults, the defenses

215 See supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text.
216 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 73, art. 77, ¶ 2.
217 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 38, ¶¶ 2–3 (setting the
minimum age of recruitment at fifteen); see also SCSL Statute, supra note 140, arts. 1, ¶ 1, 7, ¶ 1;
Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note 100, arts. 2, 4, ¶ 1 (suggesting increasing the minimum
age of recruitment to eighteen).
218 See Additional Protocol II, supra note 77, art. 6.
219 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85 arts. 37, 40.
220 See Beijing Rules, supra note 107, ¶ 7.
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of duress,221 intoxication,222 and superior orders223 will be particularly applicable in
hybrid tribunals. Finally, the sanctions a child soldier can be subjected to must be
limited. Imprisonment should be a last resort, and the death penalty and life
imprisonment without possibility of parole should be expressly forbidden. 224
Consistent with the body of international criminal law explored in this Essay, the
focus should be on rehabilitating child soldiers and reintegrating them into their
communities.
CONCLUSION
The difficulty of balancing cries for justice with the best interests of children
has resulted in a clear gap in international criminal law. Although the relevant
international conventions, U.N. resolutions, and court and tribunal statutes seem to
lead to the conclusion that child soldiers may be held accountable for their crimes,
the question of prosecution is far from clear-cut. As the number of child soldiers
across the world continues to rise, there must be a coherent response to this issue
that is consistent with existing standards of international law.
Moving forward, the best interests of the child standard instructs us that
victimhood must win out over prosecution. Continued emphasis must be placed on
prosecuting the adult commanders who are responsible for recruiting and using
children in armed conflicts, and future international courts and tribunals should
exclude all children who were under the age of eighteen at the time of their alleged
crimes from their jurisdiction. Rather than forcing children to stand trial, the focus
must be on rehabilitating former child soldiers and promoting the reintegration of
children into their communities. “Children are humanity’s most valuable investment
in the future,”225 and closing this gap in international criminal law will afford them
the protection they need and deserve.

221 See generally JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 135–55 (4th ed. 2013). Imposing these extensive limitations on the prosecution of
children is particularly important because the duress defense does not extend to war crimes.
222 See generally SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1004–14 (10th ed. 2017).
223 See generally PAUST ET AL., supra note 221, at 122–27, 132–34.
224 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 37(a); Beijing Rules, supra
note 107, ¶¶ 17.2, 17.3; Additional Protocol II, supra note 77, art. 6; Geneva Convention IV, supra
note 71, art. 68. The conclusion that child soldiers subject to prosecution should not be sentenced
to death or life imprisonment is also supported by U.S. caselaw. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the application of the death penalty to an individual
who was under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense violated the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Five years later, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on
juveniles for nonhomicide crimes also infringed the Eighth Amendment. See generally Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
225 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 426.

